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1Article 158(3) of the Hong Kong Basic Law and the
Preliminary Reference Procedure of the
European Union
Patrick Jiang* and Gonzalo Villalta Puig **
Abstract
This Article analyses the preliminary reference procedure under Article 158(3) of the
Hong Kong Basic Law and its transplantation from Article 267 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union. Preliminary reference procedures require courts of final
appeal to refer certain questions of law to a higher legal authority for determination before they
can give judgement. This Article argues that this area of Hong Kong constitutional law is
underdeveloped, due in large part to the unwillingness of the Hong Kong judiciary to respect the
interests of the national legislature. An examination of the preliminary reference procedure, as
practiced in the E.U., makes clear that the constitutional order in Hong Kong must do more to
balance regional and national interests. To that end, this Article recommends several reforms:
1) to eliminate the existing jurisprudence regarding Article 158(3) of the Basic Law; 2) to
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adopt E.U.-style doctrines of judicial economy, including irrelevant question, acte éclairé, and
acte clair; 3) to adopt a doctrine of sincere cooperation, so as to increase the quality and
quantity of judicial references; and 4) to modernize the concept of Hong Kong law to a hybrid
system of common law and Chinese law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2015 marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the promulgation of
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s
Republic of China (Basic Law), while 2017 marked twenty years since the return
of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). These are
major milestones for a unique constitutional experiment in which the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC (Hong Kong) and the rest of
China (mainland China) co-exist as the same sovereign country but under
completely different political, legal, and economic systems. The principle of this
co-existence—“One Country, Two Systems”—is fundamental to the Basic Law.
Both mainland China and Hong Kong have gained experience while living
under this unique constitutional system. Yet, many areas of constitutional law
remain underdeveloped. This is partly due to the unprecedented nature of the
Basic Law, meaning that Hong Kong has to build up a constitutional
jurisprudence from scratch. It is also partly due to political sensitivities, which
inhibit a vigorous and constructive judicial dialogue.
This Article focuses on Article 158(3) of the Basic Law, which has proved
to be one of its most controversial provisions. It defines a preliminary reference
procedure, through which the National People’s Congress Standing Committee
(NPCSC)—the legislator of the central government in Beijing—is to be the
ultimate interpreter of the Basic Law. Under Article 158(3), Hong Kong courts
must refer questions of law to the NPCSC when judicial decisions require
interpretations of certain Basic Law provisions and such judicial decisions
cannot be appealed. This situation is openly opposed by many lawyers and
judges in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA), the
highest regional court in Hong Kong, has seldom dealt with Article 158(3), and,
when it has, it has decided cases in confusing, even absurd, ways to avoid
making references to the NPCSC.
The jurisprudential development of Basic Law Article 158(3) remains
primitive. The judicial and political elites do not agree on when a preliminary
reference must be made. The people of Hong Kong have a poor understanding
about the procedure’s role in the constitutional order. Politics and law are often
conflated, and when that happens, legal clarity is rarely the victor.
This Article argues that it is time to recall the European Union (E.U.)
origins of Article 158(3). Article 158(3) was explicitly modelled upon the
preliminary reference procedure in Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU).1 The E.U., unlike Hong Kong, has developed a
1 SHUWEN WANG, INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION 216–17 (2d ed. 2009).
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workable and reputable jurisprudence to govern its preliminary references.
Given the plain intention of the Basic Law to imitate the E.U.’s constitution in
this provision, it is worth considering whether Hong Kong can also imitate the
E.U.’s subsequent practice and jurisprudence. While existing literature tends to
emphasize the Basic Law’s difference from other constitutional systems, Basic
Law Article 158(3) is an instance of similarity in which Hong Kong can learn
much from a foreign jurisdiction. Indeed, Hong Kong will have to learn quickly
if it wants to prove, before the expiry date of the Basic Law in 2047, that the
latter is a workable constitutional document in all respects.
Section II of this Article gives a brief summary of the origins of Article
158(3) and the confusing jurisprudence surrounding it. Section III explains the
essential similarities between Basic Law Article 158(3) and TFEU Article 267.
Section IV then explains how three E.U. rules of judicial economy (irrelevant
question, acte éclairé, and acte clair) can be imitated by Hong Kong. Section V
explains that Article 158(3), being copied from an E.U. treaty, necessarily brings
with it the E.U. doctrine of sincere cooperation. Sincere cooperation is currently
lacking in Hong Kong, but it is needed to realize the true design of the Basic
Law. Finally, Section VI recommends important steps that the CFA must take to
realize the intent of Article 158(3).
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ARTICLE 158(3) OF THE
BASIC LAW
The Basic Law was drafted by a committee made up of fifty-nine
politicians, technocrats, and legal experts: thirty-six from mainland China and
twenty-three from Hong Kong.2 Over the course of about four-and-a-half years,
from July 1985 to February 1990, the committee produced two drafts,
respectively opened to public comment in 1988 and 1989, and a final draft,
which was adopted in 1990.3 The Basic Law Drafting Committee also had the
assistance of the Basic Law Consultative Committee, consisting of 180 people
from Hong Kong, and the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, which facilitated
communication between the Chinese and British governments during the
handover of Hong Kong.4
Collectively, the people contributing to the creation of the Basic Law had
knowledge of diverse systems of law, including the English common law and
2 For brief history and timeline of the Basic Law’s drafting, see THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW:
BLUEPRINT FOR ‘STABILITY AND PROSPERITY’ UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? Appendix B (Ming
K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., 1991).
3 Id.
4 Id.
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Chinese civil law. It is reasonable to suppose that the final product benefited
from many people’s experience in existing systems. However, only one provision
in the Basic Law is copied explicitly from a foreign source. That provision is
Basic Law Article 158(3), which defines the preliminary reference procedure for
interpretation of the Basic Law:
The courts of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may also
interpret [provisions of this Law which are outside the limits of the
autonomy of the Region] in adjudicating cases. However, if the courts of the
Region, in adjudicating cases, need to interpret the provisions of this Law
concerning affairs which are the responsibility of the Central People’s
Government, or concerning the relationship between the Central
Authorities and the Region, and if such interpretation will affect the
judgments on the cases, the courts of the Region shall, before making their
final judgments which are not appealable, seek an interpretation of the
relevant provisions from the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress through the Court of Final Appeal of the Region. When the
Standing Committee makes an interpretation of the provisions concerned,
the courts of the Region, in applying those provisions, shall follow the
interpretation of the Standing Committee. However, judgments previously
rendered shall not be affected.5
To summarize, there are areas of the Basic Law that are wholly within the
autonomous control of Hong Kong and areas that are not. For those that are
not, the ultimate power of interpretation is not with the Hong Kong courts but
with the NPCSC. Furthermore, if a Hong Kong court comes upon an issue
outside of regional autonomy that affects the outcome of a case that is not
appealable, the court must seek an authoritative interpretation from the NPCSC.
Thus, Article 158(3) effectively changed the judicial hierarchy in Hong
Kong to reflect the territory’s transition from a colony to a highly autonomous
region. Under colonial rule, legal questions could be appealed to the Judicial
Committee of the U.K.’s Privy Council.6 After the handover, Hong Kong was
given an independent judiciary with the power of final adjudication and
interpretation over large areas of legal competence. For other areas that were
beyond the legal competence of Hong Kong, a national body had to have a right
of participation, to make final interpretations on issues that concerned the
central government. The solution of Article 158(3) was to adopt an E.U.-style
preliminary reference procedure, to suit the new constitutional order.7
5 XIANGGANG JIBEN FA [THE BASIC LAW OF THEHONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 158(3) (H.K.) [hereinafter BASIC LAW].
6 See China Field Limited v. Appeal Tribunal (Buildings), [2009] 5 H.K.L.R.D. 662, at ¶¶ 79, 81
(C.F.A.).
7 See Zhenmin Wang, From the Judicial Committee of the British Privy Council to the Standing Committee of the
Chinese National People’s Congress: An Evaluation of the Legal Interpretive System after the Handover, 37
H.K.L.J. 605, 614 (2007).
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A. Case Law
Article 158(3) was a creative solution to an unusual historical problem. On
its surface, it strikes a balance between the interests of two layers of government:
the Central People’s Government of the PRC and the Hong Kong regional
government. It assigns to each a respective place in judicial interpretation where
the division of competence makes it appropriate. However, Article 158(3) has
been controversial in practice.
According to Chinese constitutional principles, the ultimate power to
interpret the Constitution of the PRC and PRC statutes must rest with the
highest organ of democratic power: the National People’s Congress.8 This body
is the national legislature and the most direct representative of the people of
China at the national level.9 The National People’s Congress is awkwardly large
and meets for only two weeks a year, so it can only deal with high-level issues as
a plenary body.10 It has a standing committee (NPCSC), a subgroup of about 160
people, that deals with finer issues of legislation throughout the year.11 One
major function of the NPCSC is to interpret legislation.12 In keeping with
Chinese constitutional principles, the NPCSC is entitled to make and interpret
the laws of the PRC at any time, for any reason.13
In the legal order of the PRC, the Basic Law is ordinary legislation;14 as
such it can be interpreted by the NPCSC like any other legislation. Article 158(3)
provides one way to solicit an NPCSC interpretation of the Basic Law, but it is
by no means the only way. Of the five NPCSC interpretations of the Basic Law
to date, only one of them was requested through Article 158(3).15 A second was
requested by the Hong Kong government via the State Council.16 Another was
8 See Dingjian Cai, Functions of the People’s Congress in the Process of Implementation of Law, in
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 35, 36 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds.,
2002) (“[S]ince [the NPC] is the supreme organ of state power, it does not allow the ultimate
power of the interpretation of law to rest with the Supreme People’s Court. Otherwise, there
would exist a power restricting the power of legislation, which is inconsistent with the principle of
democratic centralism.”).
9 See QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 124 (2012)
(describing the National and Local People’s Congresses, “which are officially regarded as the
cornerstone of the current Constitution and the primary symbol of China’s democracy”).
10 Id. at 131–32.
11 Id.
12 XIANFA [CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] art. 67(4) (1982) (China).
13 See ZHANG, supra note 9, at 135–36.
14 BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at Instrument 9 (documenting the adoption of the Basic Law by the
National People’s Congress).
15 Id. at Instrument 22.
16 Id. at Instrument 17.
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requested by the State Council itself.17 And two others were requested by the
NPCSC’s Council of Chairmen.18 So far, nearly all NPCSC Basic Law
interpretations have not been obtained through the Article 158(3) procedure.
The concept of NPCSC interpretation is alien to common law lawyers. In
common law systems, laws are supposed to be interpreted by courts in the
course of litigation, and legislatures are not supposed to determine the outcome
of judicial proceedings.19 The fact that the NPCSC can make interpretations that
are not consistent with common law procedure, and not specifically allowed by
Article 158(3), is said by some to undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy and
judicial independence.20
The Court of Final Appeals (CFA) is likewise unenthusiastic about the
interpretive powers of the NPCSC. Although the CFA recognizes the NPCSC’s
constitutional role,21 the CFA prefers not to incur an Article 158(3) obligation to
refer. For its part, the CFA has articulated a confusing set of rules establishing
when it will or will not refer questions to the NPCSC. The rules revolve around
four tests: classification, predominant provision, necessity, and arguability.
1. Classification
The first test for judicial referral concerns “classification.” The CFA
announced the test in the case of Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration.22 In that
case, several children who claimed to be born permanent residents of Hong
Kong attempted to assert their right of abode in Hong Kong. All of them had
entered or stayed in Hong Kong without proper documentation. At issue in the
case was the interplay between two provisions of the Basic Law: Article 24
(defining permanent residents)23 and Article 22(4) (requiring people from other
parts of China to apply for approval before entering Hong Kong).24 Could a
17 Id. at Instrument 20.
18 Id. at Instruments 18, 25.
19 See Zhenmin Wang, supra note 7, at 610–11; Andrew Li, The Development of the Common Law in Hong
Kong under One Country Two Systems, 21 SING. ACAD. L.J. 375, 380–81 (2009).
20 See, for example, Yash Ghai, The Intersection of Chinese Law and the Common Law in the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region: Question of Technique or Politics?, 37 H.K.L.J. 363, 390–91 (2007); Albert H.Y.
Chen, The Rule of Law under One Country Two Systems: The Case of Hong Kong, 1997-2010, 6 NAT’L
TAIWANU. L. REV. 269, 275 (2011).
21 The plenary power of the NPCSC to interpret the Basic Law is confirmed by the Hong Kong
Court of Final Appeal in Lau Kong Yung v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 3 H.K.L.R.D. 778
(C.F.A.).
22 Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration, [1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 315 (C.F.A.).
23 BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at art. 24 (listing six categories of permanent residents).
24 Id. at art. 2 (“For entry into the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, people from other
parts of China must apply for approval.”).
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permanent resident under Article 24 nevertheless be denied recognition by the
Director of Immigration for not complying with Article 22(4)? Put another way,
was Article 24 permanent resident status qualified by Article 22(4)’s procedural
requirements?
The CFA considered whether it was necessary to ask the NPCSC for an
interpretation. First, the CFA examined whether “the provisions of the Basic
Law in question (a) concern affairs which are the responsibility of the Central
People’s Government; or (b) concern the relationship between the Central
Authorities and the Region.”25 Such provisions are so-called “excluded
provisions.”26 Provisions of the Basic Law that are not excluded provisions do
not need to be referred to the NPCSC. The CFA called this query the
“classification” test.
Unfortunately, the CFA did not give any details about how to identify
excluded provisions. It only “assume[d] that Article 22(4) is an excluded
provision on the sole basis that it concerns the relationship between the Central
Authorities and the Region.”27 The CFA also asserted, without evidence, that
Article 24, “being a provision within the limits of the Region’s autonomy, is not
an excluded provision.”28
2. Predominant Provision
Although the CFA found that Article 22(4) was an excluded provision and
Article 24 was not, this did not resolve the matter because the different
questions of interpretation did not separate cleanly. The proper interpretation of
Article 24 (the non-excluded provision) depended upon the interpretation of
Article 22(4) (the excluded provision). Were the NPCSC to interpret Article
22(4), it would indirectly determine the interpretation of Article 24. Should the
NPCSC be allowed to do so?
The CFA thought not. It declared that a main objective of Article 158(3)
was to authorize the CFA to “interpret on [its] own the provisions within the
limits of the Region’s autonomy.”29 If the NPCSC could weigh in on the
interpretation of non-excluded provisions, even indirectly, that “would be a
substantial derogation from the Region’s autonomy and cannot be right.”30
Consequently, the CFA invented a “predominant provision” test:
25 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 22, at ¶ 89.
26 Id. at ¶ 86.
27 Id. at ¶ 97.
28 Id. at ¶ 99.
29 Id. at ¶ 104 (internal quotes omitted).
30 Id. at ¶ 102.
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[A]s a matter of substance, what predominantly is the provision that has to
be interpreted in the adjudication of the case? If the answer is an excluded
provision, the Court is obliged to refer. If the answer is a provision which is
not an excluded provision, then no reference has to be made, although an
excluded provision is arguably relevant to the construction of the non-
excluded provision even to the extent of qualifying it.31
Again, the CFA did not give any reasoning when it invented and then used this
predominant provision test.32 It only asserted that Article 24 was predominant in
this case. Thus, the CFA determined that there was no role for the NPCSC. The
CFA proceeded to construe both Article 24 and Article 22(4), even though one
of them was an excluded provision.
3. Necessity
The third test for judicial referral is the “necessity” test, although the CFA
in Ng Ka Ling did not actually apply it.33 The necessity test asks whether the
court needs to interpret any excluded provisions and if that interpretation would
affect judgment in the case.34 If so, the CFA must refer the interpretation to the
NPCSC.
In Democratic Republic of the Congo v. FG Hemisphere Associates LLC,35 the CFA
finally put the necessity test into practice. That case asked whether Hong Kong
courts should apply an absolute or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. In
question were Articles 13 and 19 of the Basic Law, both of which, according to
the CFA, “plainly” were excluded provisions.36 The CFA then applied the
necessity test. Still, the treatment was cursory:
[T]he [Democratic Republic of the Congo] has not waived its immunity.
Hence the case cannot be resolved without a determination of the questions
of interpretation affecting the meaning of Articles 13 and 19 of the Basic
Law . . . The necessity condition is therefore satisfied.37
The CFA has never provided any details about how to determine necessity.
31 Id. at ¶ 103.
32 Po-Jen Yap, 10 Years of the Basic Law: The Rise, Retreat, and Resurgence of Judicial Power in Hong Kong, 36
COMMON L. WORLD REV. 166, 171 (2007).
33 Ng Ka Ling, supra note 22, at ¶ 89.
34 Id.
35 Dem. Rep. Congo v. F.G. Hemisphere Assocs., [2011] 1 H.K.C.F.A.R. 41 (C.F.A.) [hereinafter
Congo].
36 Id. at ¶ 403.
37 Id. at ¶ 406.
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4. Arguability
Finally, there is an arguability test. Congo explained it in this way: “[O]nce
the classification and the necessity conditions were satisfied there was a duty to
make a reference of the question of interpretation if it was arguable but not if it
was plainly and obviously bad.”38
Thus, Congo firmly identified arguability as a separate and final test, after
classification and necessity, to deny a reference to any argument that was plainly
and obviously bad. It is not clear how the arguability test gets applied because
the CFA has never found an argument to have come close to failing it.39
B. Confusion and Controversy
1. Order of Operations
The CFA’s law on preliminary references is a mess. One serious question
that has upset scholars is about the order of operations. Congo, the most recent
case on point, articulated the four tests in this order: 1) classification, 2)
predominant provision, 3) necessity, and 4) arguability.40 The CFA did not say
that the order was strict, but government bodies41 and scholars have gone on to
assume that it is orthodox. However, this strict order of operations is not
consistent with logic or judicial economy. Scholars have expended considerable
energy trying to make sense of it.
Denis Chang and Albert Chen have debated whether the CFA is generally
right to consider classification before necessity. The critical question is,
according to Chang, “[i] s there a need in this case to interpret an Excluded
Provision?”42 He argues that, to answer the question, one must first decide if one
is dealing with an excluded provision.43 On the other hand, Chen argues that
38 Id. at ¶ 398 (citing Ng Ka Ling, supra note 22).
39 See, for example, id. at ¶ 404 (“We consider questions relating to Articles 13 and 19 clearly arguable.
No other conclusion as to arguability is possible when regard is had to the conflicting views
expressed in the courts below, particularly the division of opinion in the Court of Appeal.”).
40 See Congo, supra note 35, at ¶ 395–98.
41 The Legislative Council recites the tests in faithful order. Legislative Council Panel on
Administration of Justice and Legal Services, LC Paper No. CB(2)1150/11-12(01), ¶¶ 14–16
https://perma.cc/UP84-SLSP.
42 Denis Chang, The Reference to the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress under Article 158 of
the Basic Law: The Question of Methodology, in HONG KONG’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT
OVER INTERPRETATION 143, 143 (Johannes M. M. Chan et al. eds., 2000).
43 Id.
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there is no point in classifying a provision unless one finds that the provision is
necessary for deciding the case.44
Elsewhere, Cora Chan has questioned the sense behind the arguability test.
She explains that either arguability is a standard of review for necessity, in which
case it is not really a separate test,45 or it is a threshold question that should come
before necessity.46 Chan is right to conclude that the CFA is confused about the
rationale behind the arguability test.
Clearly, the order of operations has become a source of significant anxiety
for scholars. The most frustrating thing is that it should never have become a
serious concern in the first place because a strict order of operations is illogical
and useless. Not even the CFA itself follows the order closely.47 This Article
argues that scholars should abandon any notion of an order of operations.
2. Predominant Provision
The second and more serious problem with the CFA’s law on preliminary
references is the predominant provision test. The CFA invented the test in Ng
Ka Ling and refused to refer the interpretation of Article 22(4) to the NPCSC,
even though Article 22(4) was an excluded provision. It was not because Article
22(4) did not matter; it was only that Article 22(4) was not predominant over
Article 24.
The logic of the predominant provision test is indefensible if one considers
the letter or the spirit of Article 158(3). In Ng Ka Ling, there was a legitimate
44 Albert Chen, The Court of Final Appeal’s Ruling in the ‘Illegal Migrant’ Children Case, in HONG KONG’S
CONSTITUTIONALDEBATE: CONFLICTOVER INTERPRETATION 113, 116 (Johannes M. M. Chan et
al. eds., 2000).
45 Cora Chan, Implementing China and Hong Kong’s Preliminary Reference System: Transposability of Article
267 TFEU Principles, 2014 PUB. L. 642, 655 (2013) (“[I]n deciding whether arguments for seeking
reference are at least arguable, the court would inevitably have to consider whether the necessity
and classification conditions are arguably satisfied. So, contrary to the CFA’s analysis in Ng Ka
Ling, arguability should not be treated as a separate stage of analysis.”).
46 Id. at 654 (suggesting that “whenever the meaning of a provision can potentially affect the
outcome of the present case, the provision is applicable and relevant to the case, and the necessity
test is passed, regardless of whether the meaning of the provision is clear”).
47 The CFA has been utterly inconsistent about the placement of the arguability test. Congo, citing Ng
Ka Ling, put the test last. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. Ng Ka Ling had actually put
arguability first, saying, “if the Court decides that it is arguable, the Court would then consider
whether the classification and necessity conditions are satisfied.” Ng Ka Ling, supra note 22, at 100.
In actual application, the CFA has done neither of the above. In Ng Ka Ling, arguability was
applied second, after classification but before predominant provision. See id. (“In the present case,
it is arguable that an excluded provision (Article 22(4)) is relevant to the interpretation of a non-
excluded provision (Article 24).”). In Congo, arguability was applied third, right before necessity.
See Congo, supra note 35, at 404 (“We consider questions relating to Articles 13 and 19 clearly
arguable.”); id. at 405 (“The only issue is whether the necessity condition is satisfied and it is to
that issue we now turn.”).
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need to interpret Article 22(4) that affected the final judgment in the case. The
plain meaning of Article 158(3) makes clear that such interpretation should be
referred to the NPCSC. To take any other view, according to Chen, would be
“inconceivable.”48 Furthermore, the NPCSC has a legitimate constitutional role
to play in making authoritative interpretations of excluded provisions like Article
22(4). Po Jen Yap argues that “[w]here there are two conflicting Basic Law
provisions, one which falls within the prerogative of the central government,
ipso facto this conflict should be resolved by the Standing Committee.”49
The predominant provision test has been soundly discredited by authors
like Chen,50 Yap, Pui Yin Lo,51 and Lawrence Li.52 But why would the CFA, a
body of prominent and respectable judges, make up a legal test that it knew to
be absurd from the start?53 The most logical explanation is that the CFA was
trying desperately to avoid a reference because it regarded references to the
NPCSC generally to be repulsive54—a view that persists to the present day.55
However, this is not consistent with the clear intention of the Basic Law,56 and
this view must change if this area of constitutional law is to have any coherence.
48 See Chen, supra note 44, at 115 (“If one takes [the facts of the case] and reads again the relevant
text of Article 158(3) . . . having regard to its ordinary, natural and plain meaning, I think it is
inconceivable for one not to conclude that the CFA in this case was bound under Article 158(3)
to refer the interpretation of Article 22(4) to the NPC Standing Committee.”).
49 Yap, supra note 32, at 172.
50 See Albert Chen, Ng Ka Ling and Article 158(3) of the Basic Law, 2001–2002 J. CHINESE & COMP. L.
222, 227.
51 Pui Yin Lo argues that the predominant provision test cannot be an objective legal test because it
is inherently biased. See PUI YIN LO, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OFHONGKONG’S BASIC LAW:
COURTS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY AFTER 1997 378 (2014) (“[The predominant provision test] is an
exercise dependent on the proponent’s point of view.”).
52 See Lawrence Li, Dual System of Constitutional Interpretation: A Hong Kong Experience, 5 VIENNA J.
INT’L CONST. L. 572, 584 (2011) (“[T]he ‘arguability’ or ‘predominant’ tests cannot justify a refusal
to refer an excluded provision if the necessity condition … is satisfied.”).
53 The CFA never took the predominant provision test seriously. See Yap, supra note 32, at 172
(“[T]he CFA has been disingenuous about the application of [the predominant provision] test, as
it paid scant attention as to how the predominant provision may be identified.”).
54 See LO, supra note 51, at 375 (arguing that the court in Ng Ka Ling had to find a way not to refer
because of the significant symbolic value of that case to autonomy and judicial independence).
55 See id. at 391 (arguing that, up through the case of Ng Siu Tung v. Director of Immigration, [2002] 1
H.K.L.R.D. 561 (C.F.A.), there is apparently “an entrenched institutional reluctance on the part of
the Court of Final Appeal to make judicial references”); LO, supra note 51, at 460 (arguing that the
CFA actively tries to insulate itself from mainland influence).
56 In its interpretation, the NPCSC criticized the CFA for failing to make the reference when it
should have. See BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at Instrument 17.
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III. A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
A few things are apparent. The jurisprudence of Article 158(3) is
convoluted and unclear. Certainly, it does not exemplify predictability and
transparency, which are values in the common law tradition. If there is no fresh
direction, judges and scholars may spend many more years trying to untangle the
problems with the judicial reference procedure. By then, people may have lost
patience with the Basic Law.
However, it may not be necessary to dwell on the shortcomings in CFA
case law if we take a slightly different approach to understanding Article 158(3).
In particular, it is possible to take a comparative approach by returning to the
original intention of the Basic Law text and gaining a straight-forward
understanding of the judicial reference procedure.
A. Similarit ies between Article 158(3) of the Basic Law and
Article 267 of the TFEU
The official introduction to the Basic Law confirms that Article 158(3) is
adapted from TFEU Article 267:
[The method of judicial reference] is adopted after consulting the measures
for interpreting laws taken by the European Community . . . . [It] effectively
helps to resolve the contradiction caused by the fact that the power of
interpretation and the power of final adjudication are not vested in the same
institution and ensures the unified understanding and implementation of the
European Community laws in its Member States, which is worth our
consideration.57
The introduction goes on to note that, in general, E.U. practice has not
impaired the judicial independence of lower courts.58
Given the clear and deliberate transplant of TFEU Article 267 into Article
158(3), it should be no surprise that they look similar:
57 See BASIC LAW, supra note 5.
58 Id. at 217.
The Sheridan
 Press
Chicago Journal of International Law
14 Vol. 19 No. 1
The similarities are self-evident. First, preliminary references are confined to
certain subject matters that affect the rights and obligations of the higher-level
government. In the case of the E.U., those subject matters encompass E.U.
treaty articles, acts of E.U. institutions, and anything that forms part of the E.U.
legal order.61 In the case of Hong Kong and the PRC, those encompass
provisions concerning “affairs which are the responsibility of the Central
People’s Government” and “the relationship between the Central Authorities
and the Region.”62 Matters that relate to exclusive powers of the lower-level
government do not require a reference to the higher-level government. Also,
preliminary references are only required where there is no further judicial
remedy in the lower jurisdiction. Some other requirements in Article 158(3) that
relate to judicial economy (namely, those regarding the need to interpret a
59 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 267, Oct. 10,
2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 165 [hereinafter TFEU].
60 BASIC LAW, supra note 5.
61 DAMIAN CHALMERS, EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 160–61 (3d ed. 2014)
(“Although Article 267 TFEU, thus, only talks of the Court giving rulings on the Treaties and acts
of the EU institutions, the Court has, consequently, interpreted it more broadly to include
anything which forms part of the wider EU legal order. This includes international agreements
concluded prior to the establishment of the European Communities to which the Union has
succeeded the Member States and general principles of law and fundamental rights.”).
62 See WANG, supra note 1.
TFEU Article 267 (excerpted)
Where any such question [concerning the
interpretation of the Treaties or the
validity and interpretation of acts of the
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of
the Union] is raised in a case pending
before a court or tribunal of a Member
State against whose decisions there is no
judicial remedy under national law, that
court or tribunal shall bring the matter
before the Court.59
Basic Law Article 158(3) (excerpted)
[I]f the courts of the Region, in
adjudicating cases, need to interpret the
provisions of this Law concerning affairs
which are the responsibility of the
Central People’s Government, or
concerning the relationship between the
Central Authorities and the Region, and
if such interpretation will affect the
judgments on the cases, the courts of the
Region shall, before making their final
judgments which are not appealable, seek
an interpretation of the relevant
provisions from the [NPCSC] through
the Court of Final Appeal of the
Region.60
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provision that will affect the judgements on the cases) have parallels not in
TFEU Article 267 but in early E.U. case law.63
Similarity is a natural and desired consequence of adaptation. Adaptation
makes sense because the intended functions of preliminary reference are the
same in both jurisdictions. In the E.U., Member States confer power upward to
the E.U., while in China, the central government confers power downward to
Hong Kong. But regardless of which direction the conferral of power flows, the
function of preliminary reference is equally valid. In the E.U., preliminary
reference seeks to achieve a uniform interpretation of E.U. laws and the
effective implementation of those laws across all Member States with their
different legal traditions.64 The Basic Law is law in Hong Kong and in the PRC
at large, and, as such, its interpretation and implementation must not clash with
the other laws and Constitution of the PRC.65 Legal uniformity in the PRC
means a consistent interpretation of relevant PRC law as applied to Hong Kong
and to other parts of the PRC.
Most interpretations and implementations of the Basic Law will not create
conflict with the other laws and Constitution of the PRC. The very intention of
“One Country, Two Systems” is to provide for a significant separation of legal
systems such that the systems seldom clash. The provisions of the Basic Law
that are likely to interact with the laws and Constitution of the PRC are the
“excluded provisions” (again, provisions concerning affairs which are the
responsibility of the Central People’s Government, or concerning the
relationship between the Central Authorities and the Region). Excluded
provisions, by definition, affect the government of Hong Kong as well as the
rights and duties of the central government. Where the practices of multiple
governments intersect, there ought to be a mechanism for achieving a consistent
understanding of law between them.
From time to time, the similarity of Basic Law Article 158(3) and TFEU
Article 267 has been noted in the scholarly literature.66 However, most authors
regard the similarities as being merely superficial. A few authors see limited
63 See Section III.B.1–3, infra.
64 See, for example, Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199,
¶ 15 (“[T]he main purpose of the powers accorded to the Court by [TFEU Article 267] is to
ensure that Community law is applied uniformly by national courts.”).
65 Regarding the necessity of NPCSC interpretation, see WANG, supra note 1, at 213 (“[O]nly when
the Central Authorities have the power to interpret the Law can unified understanding and
implementation of the Law be guaranteed throughout the country.”).
66 See, for example, Firma Foto-Frost, supra note 64; WANG, supra note 1.
The Sheridan
 Press
Chicago Journal of International Law
16 Vol. 19 No. 1
applications in the comparison.67 Most authors focus on fatal differences
between the Hong Kong setup and the E.U. setup, and conclude that no
comparison is useful.68 Here again, the complaints are primarily that the NPCSC
is not a judicial body and that it makes interpretations outside the course of
litigation.
It ought to strike more people that neither complaint, at least
formalistically, condemns the Basic Law regime. Constitutions do not have to be
solely interpreted by courts. Elsewhere in the world, they are interpreted by
legislatures, including in Finland, where a committee of the Finnish Parliament,
not a court, is the final interpreter.69 In other countries like the U.K. that have a
principle of parliamentary sovereignty, legislatures pass ordinary legislation to
reverse constitutional judgments of courts (leaving previously rendered
judgments unaffected, of course).70 Furthermore, in some countries, courts
render advisory opinions outside the course of litigation. For example, in
Canada, the Supreme Court entertains “reference questions” about
constitutional issues from the federal cabinet and provincial governments.71 Ten
states of the U.S. allow their supreme courts to provide advisory opinions to the
state’s executives or legislatures, usually about constitutional issues.72 All of the
above jurisdictions are paragons of the rule of law.
Finally, the fact remains that Basic Law Article 158(3) was intended to
emulate TFEU Article 267, so a coherent legal practice should strive to give
effect to that intent. None of the foregoing complaints undermine the major
goal of preliminary references—to achieve uniform interpretation of laws where
multiple levels of government have rights and obligations. Comparison between
67 See, for example, Chan, supra note 45, at 655 (seeing room for adoption of the doctrine of acte
éclairé but not acte clair); Chen, supra note 44, at 121 (seeing value in E.U. law for learning the
meaning of “necessity”).
68 See, for example, JAMES CRAWFORD, RIGHTS INONE COUNTRY: HONG KONG AND CHINA 9 (2005);
Mark Elliott & Christopher Forsyth, The Rule of Law in Hong Kong: Immigrant Children, the Court of
Final Appeal and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 2000 ASIA PAC. L. REV. 53, 72
(2016).
69 See Markku Suksi, Finland, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 87 (Dawn
Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011).
70 See Zhenmin Wang, A Decade of Hong Kong Basic Law Actualization, in CHINA’S HONG KONG
TRANSFORMED: RETROSPECTS AND PROSPECTS BEYOND THE FIRST DECADE 155, 165 (Ming K.
Chan ed., 2008).
71 See Tsvi Kahana, Canada, in HOW CONSTITUTIONS CHANGE, supra note 69, at 9. The similarity
between Hong Kong and Canada was also noted by Pui Yin Lo. See LO, supra note 51, at 412
n. 180.
72 MEL A. TOPF, A DOUBTFUL AND PERILOUS EXPERIMENT: ADVISORY OPINIONS, STATE
CONSTITUTIONS, AND JUDICIAL SUPREMACY ix (2011).
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Basic Law Article 158(3) and TFEU Article 267 remains valid, and it ought to be
explored much more deeply.
B. Preliminary Reference Procedure of the E.U.
At today’s historical juncture, given the similar origins, structures, and
functions of Basic Law Article 158 and TFEU Article 267, it is sensible to ask
again whether Hong Kong’s judicial reference procedure can be improved by
more closely following the E.U.’s example.
The relevant law of the E.U. can be summed up briefly: when national
courts encounter a question about E.U. law, they can initiate a discretionary or
non-discretionary referral to the Court of Justice of the European Union
(European Court of Justice, or ECJ).73 Discretionary referrals are available to any
court, of any level, at any stage of proceedings. In effect, the right of
discretionary referral empowers every court in the E.U. to be an active
participant in E.U. law.74 Discretionary referrals impose no obligations on any
courts, and they are not consequential to the topic of this article.
Non-discretionary referrals are required by TFEU Article 267 whenever a
national court faces a question of E.U. law and there is no further judicial
remedy. However, there are three exceptions of judicial economy in the case law:
irrelevant question, acte éclairé, and acte clair.
1. Irrelevant Question
The irrelevant question doctrine proposes that national courts should not
refer questions that are not relevant to the outcome of a case. The concept was
clearly stated in Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health:75
[The] mere fact that a party contends that the dispute gives rise to a
question concerning the interpretation of Community law does not mean
that the court or tribunal concerned is compelled to [refer it to the Court of
Justice]. . . .
73 PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 468 (6th ed. 2015)
(“Article 267 TFEU draws a distinction between courts or tribunals with a discretion to refer to
the CJEU, Article 267(2), and courts or tribunals ‘against whose decisions there is no judicial
remedy under national law’, Article 267(3), which have an obligation to refer, provided that a
decision on a question is necessary to enable judgment to be given.”).
74 CHALMERS, supra note 61, at 170 (“All national courts are granted equal possibilities to make a
reference to the Court of Justice and no national court can disenfranchise another national
court. . . . For lower courts, scornful of higher courts or feeling unduly constrained by national
judicial hierarchies, the EU judicial order is one which offers them many opportunities.”).
75 Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415
[hereinafter CILFIT].
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[National] courts or tribunals are not obliged to refer to the Court of Justice
a question concerning the interpretation of Community law raised before
them if that question is not relevant, that is to say, if the answer to that
question, regardless of what it may be, can in no way affect the outcome of
the case.76
Importantly, it is up to the national court’s own discretion whether a
question is relevant or not.77
2. Acte Éclairé
The acte éclairé doctrine says that national courts do not have to refer a
question where the answer is already clear from a previous ruling of the ECJ.
The concept was articulated in the case of Da Costa en Schaake v. Nederlandse
Belastingadministratie:78
Although [TFEU Article 267] unreservedly requires [national courts of final
instance] to refer to the Court every question of interpretation raised before
them, the authority of an interpretation under [Article 267] already given by
the Court may deprive the obligation of its purpose and thus empty it of its
substance. Such is the case especially when the question raised is materially
identical with a question which has already been the subject of a preliminary
ruling in a similar case.79
Acte éclairé is valid even if the previous ruling was directed to a different court in
a different member state, or even if the questions of interpretation are not
strictly identical.80 One can think of acte éclairé as a sort of stare decisis in E.U. law.
3. Acte Clair
The acte clair doctrine allows national courts to omit referrals where
the interpretation of E.U. law is so obvious from the text that there is no room
for reasonable doubt.81 Obviousness, of course, is viewed from the perspective
of the ECJ and the entire E.U.82 Again, the main authority is CILFIT:
The correct application of Union law may be so obvious as to leave no
scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question
raised is to be resolved. Before it comes to the conclusion that such is the
case, the national court or tribunal must be convinced that the matter is
equally obvious to the courts of the other Member States and to the Court
76 Id. at ¶¶ 9–10.
77 Id. at ¶ 10.
78 Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa en Schaake v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, 1963 E.C.R. 31.
79 Id.
80 See CRAIG& DE BÚRCA, supra note 73, at 451.
81 Case 495/03, Intermodal Transports BV v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën, 2005 E.C.R. I-8151,
¶ 39.
82 Id.
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of Justice. Only if those conditions are satisfied may the national court or
tribunal refrain from submitting the question to the Court of Justice and
take upon itself the responsibility for resolving it.83
The exception provided by acte clair is a narrow one, and it is debated
whether national courts are truly capable of knowing what is “obvious” to the
ECJ.84 Some scholars argue that acte clair is actually a political “valve,” disguised
as a legal rule to let national courts escape referrals when they are unwilling to
make them.85 Others say that acte clair might induce courts of different levels to
cooperate more by promoting trust between them.86 Still others speculate that
some national courts may have abused acte clair,87 but so far there has been no
complaint from the ECJ.
IV. LESSONS FOR HONG KONG FROM THE E.U.
The E.U. treaty and rules of judicial economy have much to teach Hong
Kong about the practice of preliminary references because there is a complete
parallelism between the procedures of the E.U. and Hong Kong. The text of
TFEU Article 267 echoes the functions that the CFA tries to achieve with its
“classification” test. The E.U. case law echoes the functions of the “necessity”
and “arguability” tests, except that the E.U. rules are much more developed.
There is no E.U. parallel to the “predominant provision” test, which has been
discredited and serves no legitimate purpose.
By making comparisons to the E.U. law, it becomes easy to understand at
least two major mistakes in the current scholarship about preliminary references
in Hong Kong: first is the continuing argument over order of operations; second
is the overly restrictive attitude towards implementing E.U.-style rules of judicial
economy. This section addresses both of these mistakes.
A. No Order of Operations
In E.U. law, there is no fixed ordering to the preliminary reference rules or
exceptions. A national court need only follow logic and expediency, so if it finds
any one reason not to refer, it can dispose of the argument on that basis alone.
This point should be instructive for Hong Kong.
In fact, there is nothing in the text or the fundamental logic of the Basic
Law that demands an order of operations. If a referral can be rejected based on
83 CILFIT, supra note 75, at ¶ 16.
84 CHALMERS, supra note 61, at 189.
85 Id. at 189.
86 CRAIG& DE BÚRCA, supra note 73, at 457.
87 CHALMERS, supra note 61, at 190.
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any one condition, then there is no point in looking at any others. A legal test
should address what is logically necessary to dispose of the question; no more,
no less.
As mentioned earlier, the CFA itself has never acknowledged a strict order
of operations. Its existence is more a product of misunderstanding by others.
However, it has attracted much scholarly attention, and it is high time that
scholars, or the CFA itself, call for an end to it. Certainly, the ECJ finds no value
in an order of operations, and neither should Hong Kong.
B. Judicial Economy
This Article argues that all the E.U. rules for judicial economy can be
emulated in Hong Kong. The irrelevant question doctrine is already in force in
Hong Kong because it is implied by the “necessity” and “arguability” tests. It is
also reasonable to say that the CFA, being a common law court, will not refer
hypothetical questions that are not genuinely disputable or are not necessary for
deciding a concrete case.
The acte éclairé doctrine, if applied to Hong Kong, suggests that the CFA
should use previous interpretations of the NPCSC to resolve substantially
similar questions in the future, without further reference. The CFA has not had
any opportunity to put such doctrine into practice, although it would probably
not be controversial.88
The acte clair doctrine, if applied to Hong Kong, suggests that the CFA
should be able to decide a case without reference if it is obvious how the
NPCSC would interpret the relevant provision. Clearly, a court should be
cautious before presuming to know what another court would decide, and this
practice would be especially controversial in Hong Kong.
The current view in the literature is that Hong Kong cannot use acte clair89
because the CFA and NPCSC use completely contradictory forms of
interpretation. For example, the CFA only ever uses the English version of the
Basic Law while the NPCSC uses the Chinese version, yet it is the Chinese
version that prevails in case of discrepancy.90 Even more problematic is the fact
that the CFA and NPCSC operate under completely different legal systems; the
CFA does not have the institutional competence to understand the Basic Law
88 See Chan, supra note 45, at 655 (“The exception of acte éclairé . . . is applicable to Hong Kong. In
fact . . . it necessarily flows from . . . the text of art.158(3).”).
89 Id. at 654 (“[T]here is no room for the CFA to apply any form of [acte clair] once it has
determined that the meaning of an excluded provision can potentially affect the outcome of the
case.”); see also LO, supra note 51, at 432 (discussing acte clair but not advocating for its application
to Hong Kong).
90 Chan, supra note 45, at 658.
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using Chinese legal principles.91 One Chinese legal principle that is often
maligned is the use of legislative intent. Legislative intent calls for the use of
materials that are outside of the statutory language, and sometimes, as applied by
the NPCSC, it changes the final result that the CFA otherwise found.92 If the
CFA and the NPCSC use such fundamentally different systems of interpretation,
scholars argue, then the CFA can never be sure, without reasonable doubt,93
how the NPCSC would interpret anything.
Clearly, there are stark differences between the legal traditions of the CFA
and NPCSC. However, overemphasizing the differences in their forms of legal
interpretation is problematic. First, it is too dismissive of the CFA’s intellect.
The Basic Law is a PRC statute, but so too are NPCSC interpretations (which
have statutory force under the Chinese legal system). If the CFA is incompetent
to read the Basic Law for itself, can it read NPCSC interpretations? Can the
CFA implement instructions from a body that it cannot purport to understand?
The CFA must be given more credit. Secondly, focusing on the differences
between forms of legal interpretation does not promote judicial economy. In any
legal system, there must be consideration for the efficient use of judicial
resources. If the CFA cannot presume to know anything about Basic Law
interpretation, how can it decide what questions are “necessary” or “arguable”?94
If the CFA has to refer even the most trivial questions, how does that square
with autonomy and judicial independence?
91 See id. at 654 (“But the CFA is not a Chinese court. There is no constitutional basis for it to adopt
Chinese methods of interpretation. Nor is it institutionally equipped to second-guess how a
Chinese body may interpret a provision.”).
92 The judgment in Ng Ka Ling was questioned by the Chief Executive, then overturned by the
NPCSC, because the CFA’s result was inconsistent with legislative intent. See Information Note
from the Legislative Council Secretariat, Interpretation of the Basic Law under Article 158(1)
(IN29/11–12), at 2.1–2.2 (“The HKSAR Government considered that CFA’s interpretation of
the relevant provisions of the Basic Law was not consistent with the legislative intent. On 18 May
1999, the Chief Executive reported to the State Council the problems he had encountered in the
implementation of the Basic Law and sought for its assistance to seek an interpretation from
NPCSC on the legislative intent of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3).”); BASIC LAW Instrument 17
(“[T]he interpretation of the Court of Final Appeal is not consistent with the legislative intent.”).
The CFA later refused to follow what was known to be an expression of legislative intent and
decided the case by itself in Ng Siu Tung v. Director of Immigration, [2002] 5 H.K.C.F.A.R. 1.
93 Cf. Intermodal Transports, supra note 81, at ¶ 34 (that the standard of review must be “no reasonable
doubt” as to how the law is to be interpreted).
94 Cora Chan draws two contradictory conclusions: first, rejecting adoption of acte clair in Hong
Kong for reasons mentioned above; and second, encouraging the CFA to “draw inspiration from
the . . . principles on acte clair,” such as looking at different language versions of the Basic Law,
to determine arguability. Chan, supra note 45, at 661. It is not clear why the CFA on its own
should have competence to read the Basic Law for arguability but not for clear meaning, since the
skills involved would be the same.
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It is the opinion of this Article that Hong Kong can and should emulate
the doctrine of acte clair. Doing so would require lawyers and judges to adjust
their mindset, but the overall task is not as impossible as some people have
feared. The following subsections describe how it can be done.
1. Distinguish Legal Acts from Political Acts
Some complain that the NPCSC sometimes makes Basic Law
interpretations in an arbitrary manner. Part of this perception comes from too
narrow an understanding of the NPCSC’s role. Lawyers need to recognize the
mixed legislative and judicial roles of the NPCSC. The NPCSC is unlike
anything that exists in the common law because it is at once the parliament and
the constitutional court of the PRC. Since the NPCSC has multiple functions, it
is important to distinguish its political acts from its judicial acts. Its acts
regarding the Basic Law may be either, or both.
When commentators debate about “interpretations” of the Basic Law by
the NPCSC, often they are referring to eight documents that are appended to
the Basic Law, known as Instruments 17 through 23 and 25.95 Although these
instruments express the NPCSC’s views on the Basic Law, they are not all
interpretations in the legal sense. The NPCSC itself is careful to distinguish them
by name. Three of the Instruments (19, 21, and 23) are called “decisions” and
are political (that is, legislative) in nature; the other five (17, 18, 20, 22, and 25)
are called “interpretations” and are legal (that is, judicial) in nature.
Instruments 19, 21, and 23 of the Basic Law are NPCSC decisions
regarding election reform in Hong Kong. They are political acts. Certain election
methods are hard-wired into the Basic Law itself, and changes to them require
constitutional amendments. The substance of constitutional amendments cannot
be found in any law because they are political questions, requiring political
consensus from many different parties. In Hong Kong, election reform is a joint
decision of the NPCSC, the Chief Executive of Hong Kong, and the Legislative
Council of Hong Kong. Instruments 19, 21, and 23 are political statements of
the NPCSC, in which the NPCSC expresses what it is willing to amend as one of
the stakeholders in the Basic Law. In contrast, Instruments 17, 18, 20, 22, and 25
are interpretations in the legal sense. For example, in Instrument 22, the NPCSC
95 BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at Instrument 17 (interpreting article 22(4) and article 24); id. at
Instrument 18 (interpreting Annex I article 7 and Annex II article III); id. at Instrument 19 (ruling
on issues related to Chief Executive and Legislative Council elections); id. at Instrument 20
(interpreting article 53(2)); id. at Instrument 21 (ruling on issues related to Chief Executive and
Legislative Council elections and on issues related to universal suffrage); id. at Instrument 22
(interpreting article 13(1) and article 19); id. at Instrument 23 (ruling on issues related to election
of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage and on Legislative Council elections); id. at
Instrument 25 (interpreting article 104).
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ruled on the nature and scope of sovereign immunity in Hong Kong lawsuits.96
These are more consistent with what common law lawyers recognize as legal
acts.
It is important to distinguish between political and legal acts of the NPCSC
because legal doctrines such as acte clair can only be applied to legal
interpretation. While Hong Kong lawyers may have trouble understanding the
NPCSC’s political decisions, they are much more familiar with the legal
interpretations. With this caveat, understanding how the NPCSC interprets laws
and applying acte clair in Hong Kong is not unmanageable.
2. Expand the Concept of Hong Kong Law
In order to implement acte clair, the CFA must be competent to interpret
laws from the point of view of the NPCSC.97 To some commentators, this
appears to be a perverse task because the CFA has no understanding of Chinese
legal methods.98 However, there are significant precedents for the CFA to
follow.
Hong Kong’s former colonial master, the U.K., seamlessly adapted to civil
law in the E.U. prior to Brexit. Since 1973, English common law has been
subordinated to a “new legal order” under the (mostly civil) E.U. law, including
giving up certain powers of final interpretation to the ECJ. Such a combination
of English common law with E.U. law was once a very radical thing,99 but it is
no longer. Early on, eminent jurists encouraged English lawyers to adapt to a
new way of thinking, for, as Lord Denning pointed out, the techniques in civil
law are not utterly incomprehensible to common lawyers.100 Those skeptical of
comparative techniques will argue that a hybrid approach, such as of a common
law lawyer practicing civil law, will never yield exactly what the civil law
intended, and perhaps this is true. However, for many decades, English lawyers
96 BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at Instrument 22 (ruling that Hong Kong law’s rules on state immunity
“must be subject to such modifications, adaptations, limitations or exceptions as are necessary so
as to be consistent with the rules or policies on state immunity that the Central People’s
Government has determined”).
97 LO, supra note 51, at 432 (“The question that should be asked is: Maybe it is clear to us, but how
about to them?”).
98 See, for example, Chan, supra note 45, at 654 (“[T]he CFA is not a Chinese court. There is no
constitutional basis for it to adopt Chinese methods of interpretation. Nor is it institutionally
equipped to second-guess how a Chinese body may interpret a provision.”).
99 For example, Lord Denning once noted that the practice of the ECJ was “completely shocking to
the old-fashioned English.” Wang, supra note 70, at 168 (quoting ALFRED DENNING, WHAT NEXT
IN THE LAW 293 (1982)).
100 Lord Denning said, “Just as in Rome you should do as Rome does, so in the European
Community, you should do as the European Court does.” Zhenmin Wang, supra note 70, at 168
(quotingALFREDDENNING, THEDISCIPLINE OF LAW 21 (1979)).
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have been practicing E.U. law successfully, and nobody nowadays finds it
untoward. What is done by English lawyers can be done by Hong Kong lawyers,
too.
To use acte clair, Hong Kong lawyers must adapt to Chinese methods of
legal interpretation. The idea has not always been anathema. Shortly after the
handover, some lawyers were optimistic that such a thing could be done. In the
famous 1997 case HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David,101 Justice Mortimer said in
obiter:
[The Basic Law] is Chinese law applicable to Hong Kong which falls initially
to be interpreted by Hong Kong courts used to interpreting laws passed in
the common law tradition, applying common law principles. No doubt,
from time to time, difficult questions of interpretation will arise, but not, it
seems to me, from any inherent difficulty arising between the two traditions.
The common law principles of interpretation, as developed in recent years,
are sufficiently wide and flexible to purposively interpret the plain language
of this semi-constitutional law. The influence of international covenants has
modified the common law principles of interpretation.102
Therefore, Hong Kong lawyers do not have to be puzzled by Chinese civil
law. For example, when faced with a question of legislative intent under Chinese
law, common law lawyers may find, as Justice Mortimer did, that “legislative
intent” is not so radically different in function from the “purposive
interpretation” that is used under common law.
From time to time, reputable Hong Kong lawyers find themselves
interpreting Chinese law. On one occasion, the Hong Kong Bar Association had
the confidence to analyze and construe an NPCSC decision, in Chinese, with
reference to the intent of the drafter, couched in the terms of legal reasoning
that are familiar to every common law lawyer.103 The Bar Association felt
compelled to discuss the drafter’s intent because “the Court of Final Appeal has
consistently emphasized that, in constitutional interpretation, one must have
regard to the context and purpose of the instrument and the relevant provision
of the instrument to be construed.”104 The Bar Association’s analysis was
precisely the kind of exercise that would prepare its members to apply acte clair.
All of this is to argue that Hong Kong lawyers should learn Chinese
methods of legal interpretation, even if it requires some effort. What might also
101 HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David, [1997] H.K.L.R.D. 761 (C.A.).
102 Id. at 364-C.
103 The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government, Consultation Document on
Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council in
2016: Submission of the Hong Kong Bar Association, at 20 (discussing the difference between
the Chinese terms “may/!” and “must/"” in the Basic Law).
104 Id.
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be helpful is more “judicial dialogue” between the CFA and NPCSC so that
lawyers can observe interpretation of the Basic Law in action. The successful
mingling of different legal systems takes a bit of time and experience.
However, it is absolutely necessary for the CFA’s practice and the
NPCSC’s practice to become compatible with each other, because, under the
unique legal order of the Basic Law, Hong Kong law is no longer merely common
law, in the same way that English law is no longer merely common law. Certain
aspects of PRC law find their way into Hong Kong law via Article 158(3) and
other provisions. To be fully competent in today’s Hong Kong law necessarily
requires knowledge of PRC law. This implicates a major change from the current
legal education model in Hong Kong.
If Hong Kong could come to grips with its unique legal order and practice
it successfully, then it could truly use the experience of TFEU Article 267 that it
was intended to inherit. Hong Kong could then fully adopt the E.U. doctrines
for judicial economy, which would strengthen the CFA’s role as an active builder
of Basic Law jurisprudence.
V. DOCTRINE OF SINCERE COOPERATION
When using E.U. law as a model, it is important to remember that all E.U.
treaty provisions exist against a background of certain general principles. In the
context of judicial references, the most relevant principle is the doctrine of
sincere cooperation.105 Sincere cooperation imposes crucial duties upon all
participants.106 On the one hand, the ECJ trusts national courts to apply E.U.
law correctly and to refer questions without hesitation. On the other hand,
national courts also trust the ECJ to give high-quality, reasoned opinions that are
easily understood and applied. Sincere cooperation can be viewed as a kind of
institutional comity, where every institution performs its duties and obligations
to all others.
There is no written equivalent of sincere cooperation in the Basic Law.
However, if Basic Law Article 158(3) is intended to be a true imitation of TFEU
Article 267, which the drafting history suggests it to be, then it is reasonable to
infer that Article 158(3) must reflect sincere cooperation in practice. The
105 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 3, Oct. 26
2012, O.J. (C 326 13).
106 Case C-2/88, Imm. J. J. Zwartveld & Others, 1990 E.C.R. I-4406, ¶¶ 17–18 (“[The principle of
sincere cooperation] not only requires the Member States to take all the measures necessary to
guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law, . . . but also imposes on Member
States and the Community institutions mutual duties of sincere cooperation. This duty of sincere
cooperation imposed on Community institutions is of particular importance vis-à-vis the judicial
authorities of the Member States, who are responsible for ensuring that Community law is applied
and respected in the national legal system.”).
The Sheridan
 Press
Chicago Journal of International Law
26 Vol. 19 No. 1
questions then become, how should Hong Kong practice sincere cooperation,
and what problems would it solve?
In the context of Article 158(3), sincere cooperation calls for increasing the
institutional comity between the CFA and the NPCSC and, more generally,
comity between the legal systems of Hong Kong and mainland China. In fact,
there are several legal principles in Hong Kong that point in the direction of
institutional comity.
One of the legal principles that calls for institutional comity is the “high
degree of autonomy.” This phrase is repeated in the Sino-British Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law itself.107 It represents a commitment by the
Central People’s Government, though everyone lives under the Constitution of
the PRC, to entrust most of the running of Hong Kong to local authorities. That
is to say, the central authority will not contradict the regional authority on
regional matters, but the regional authority must defer to the central authority on
the few areas that remain central matters. This principle has largely been
respected. In the vast areas of the Basic Law that concern local affairs, over
which the CFA exercises final interpretation and adjudication, the NPCSC has
not interfered.108
Another principle that echoes institutional comity is the exhortation to
“love the motherland and Hong Kong.” This phrase was coined by Deng
Xiaoping to explain that China expected Hong Kong’s leaders to109 respect the
nation, uphold One Country, Two Systems, and protect Hong Kong’s prosperity
and stability after 1997.110 Deng’s phrase has become controversial lately because
of its appearance in the even more controversial White Paper of June 2014.111
Among other things, the White Paper reaffirmed, using Deng’s words, that
107 See Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, China-U.K., ¶ 3(2), Dec. 19,
1984, 1399 U.N.T.S. 33; BASIC LAW, supra note 5, at art. 2.
108 See generally Yap, supra note 32, at § V.
109 Xiaoping Deng, Maintain Prosperity and Stability in Hong Kong, in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG
XIAOPING 80, 82 (1984) (“There is only one requirement for [administrators of Hong Kong after
1997]: they must be patriots, that is, people who love the motherland and Hong Kong.”).
110 Xiaoping Deng, One Country, Two Systems, in 3 SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING, supra note
109, at 68, 70 (“It must be required that patriots form the main body of administrators, that is, of
the future government of the Hong Kong special region. . . . A patriot is one who respects the
Chinese nation, sincerely supports the motherland’s resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong
and wishes not to impair Hong Kong’s prosperity and stability. . . . We don’t demand that they be
in favour of China’s socialist system; we only ask them to love the motherland and Hong Kong.”)
111 Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, The Practice of the
“One Country, Two Systems” Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (White
Paper) (June 10, 2014) https://perma.cc/8UDT-SLX5.
The Sheridan
 Press
Hong Kong and E.U. Preliminary References Jiang and Villalta Puig
Summer 2018 27
government officials, including judges, ought to be “patriots” with “loyalty to
one’s country.”112
To some people in Hong Kong, “loyalty to one’s country” sounds sinister,
but legal scholars should not read controversy into these words. Elsewhere,
central government officials have emphasized that loyalty to the country means
“supporting the principle of One Country, Two Systems;” it includes “not
opposing the central government,” which means not advocating for the
overthrow of the Central Government, the Constitution of the PRC, or the
respective political and economic systems of mainland China and Hong Kong.113
Respect for the other governments and upholding the basic constitutional
structure would seem to be minimum expectations preceding institutional
comity.
The principle of sincere cooperation would also require a more
constructive use of the judicial reference process. First, the CFA should openly
accept its constitutional duty of judicial referral and put the duty into practice. It
cannot claim that it understands Article 158(3) but then avoid references using
dubious legal theories. Second, the NPCSC should provide sufficient reasoning
and analysis for its interpretations, so as to educate the end user about its
methods and concerns. It is not the NPCSC’s habit to do so.114 Recently, the
NPCSC took a step in the right direction when it issued a separate, explanatory
document on its ruling about the scope of sovereign immunity.115 Future
explanations could be even more detailed, in the manner of common law judicial
opinions, and incorporated into the text of the interpretation itself. In the
interest of sincere cooperation, the NPCSC should equip the CFA with
sufficient knowledge to be able to use acte clair or to interpret the Basic Law
consistently.
Sincere cooperation requires focused effort from many sides, but it is
valuable to the development of Hong Kong constitutional law if it can be
realized. Sincere cooperation would build up a sufficient body of Basic Law
interpretations from which lawyers can learn and extrapolate. Ultimately, it
112 Id. at § V.3.
113 See, for example, Kahon Chan, Definition of “Love the Country Love Hong Kong” Very Clear, CHINA
DAILYASIA (Dec. 20, 2013).
114 See Anthony Mason, The Rule of Law in the Shadow of a Giant: The Hong Kong Experience, 33 SYDNEY
L. REV. 623, 642 (2011) (“[The NPCSC] provides little in the way of reasoning for its interpretive
conclusion [so they] have not constructed a corpus of constitutional law on which the Hong
Kong courts could draw, even assuming it to be legitimate to do so.”).
115 Fei Li, The Explanations on the Draft Interpretation of Paragraph 1, Article 13 and Article 19 of
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of
China by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 22nd Sess. Standing
Committee of the Eleventh National People’s Congress (Aug. 24, 2011).
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would create a reputable and prestigious jurisprudence that would make the
Basic Law worthy of its “constitutional” name.
VI. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE COURT OF FINAL APPEAL
This Article has made a number of suggestions that require effort from
many different actors, but one actor is the most important of all: the CFA.
Meaningful change will not begin without movement from the CFA. To that
end, this Article recommends several actions that the CFA should undertake at
the earliest opportunity.
First, the CFA should abandon the Ng Ka Ling test. It is an unfortunate
relic that is no longer defensible. The CFA should start afresh and base its rules
on doctrines that are consistent with the intent and design of the constitutional
order. The CFA has the opportunity to demonstrate that it has a sophisticated
understanding of its constitutional interplay with the NPCSC and shape new
jurisprudence to suit the needs of Hong Kong.
Second, the CFA should remember and draw inspiration from the origins
of Article 158(3). The CFA should establish a new preliminary reference
jurisprudence that is based on the most important aspects of E.U. law. The two
most obvious and immediate targets are the irrelevant question and acte éclairé
doctrines. The CFA is well-placed to implement these on its own.
Third, the CFA should take the initiative to understand Chinese legal
interpretive methods. It should lead by example, addressing these methods in its
judgments, and in doing so encourage practitioners to use Chinese legal
arguments. Once the CFA achieves a high level of understanding of Chinese
interpretive methods, the NPCSC would then have a basis to trust that the CFA
is a competent partner implementing the Basic Law in Hong Kong. In other
words, the CFA would gain the benefit of the doubt, and the NPCSC would be
more content to let the CFA do its work.
Finally, the CFA should engage in constructive dialogue with the NPCSC.
To do so, the CFA should make preliminary references liberally, even
enthusiastically. At the same time, the CFA should ask the NPCSC for legal
reasoning. At a suitable time, with a sufficient acquis and a firm grasp of Chinese
interpretive methods, the CFA should attempt a doctrine of acte clair. In this way,
the CFA would practice acte clair in a convincing way that makes scholars,
practitioners, and the NPCSC believe in this transplant from E.U. law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Basic Law has been in practice for twenty years, yet critical aspects of
Hong Kong’s Constitution remain disappointingly primitive. In particular, the
law regarding the interaction between Hong Kong and PRC legal systems,
stemming from Article 158(3), is underdeveloped at best and misguided at worst.
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A major impediment has been the Hong Kong judiciary’s unwillingness to
respect the role of the NPCSC under the Basic Law’s constitutional order.
Given the clear historical transplant of TFEU Article 267 into the Basic
Law’s Article 158(3), it is worth giving serious thought to how the E.U.
experience with preliminary references can help develop Hong Kong’s
constitutional jurisprudence. The similarities between Article 267 and Article
158(3) are not just superficial; they implicate the very forms and purposes of
these constitutional provisions. Hong Kong should embrace the opportunity for
direct comparison.
Hong Kong courts can adopt all the rules of judicial economy, including
the doctrines of irrelevant question, acte éclairé, and acte clair. Doing so would
encourage a more inclusive view of what modern Hong Kong law is—not
merely common law but a common law with aspects of Chinese law as well.
Hong Kong should also recognize a fundamental principle of sincere
cooperation. It would require an active judicial dialogue between the CFA and
the NPCSC. It would require the CFA to refer questions of interpretation in
good faith, and it would require the NPCSC to give reasoned, instructive
interpretations. The constitutional design of the Basic Law expects nothing less
than full cooperation and mutual respect.
Developing the Basic Law was never going to be easy. But, as one
respected Hong Kong constitutional scholar has said:
[I]f ‘one country, two systems’ is to work, it is necessary to develop a
jurisprudence that is acceptable to both sides and one that reconciles the
differences or at least provides principles and norms that define what
differences are tolerable.116
A return to Article 158(3)’s E.U. roots would accomplish just that. It would
convert the Basic Law into a constitutional system with productive judicial
dialogue, clear precedents, coexistence of two systems in one country, and
continued impact beyond 2047.
116 Albert Chen, Another Case of Conflict Between the Court of Final Appeal and the NPC Standing
Committee?, 31 H.K.L.J. 179, 185 (2001).
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